Battle of Kulikovo (Mamaevo Massacre), a battle between the united Russian army led by the Moscow Grand Duke Dmitry Ivanovich and the army of the temnik of the Golden Horde Mamai, which took place on September 8, 1380 on the Kulikovo field (a historical area between the Don, Nepryadva and Krasivaya Mecha rivers in the south- east of the Tula region.
Strengthening the Moscow Principality in the 60s of the 14th century. and the unification around him of the remaining lands of North-Eastern Rus' occurred almost simultaneously with the strengthening of the power of the temnik Mamai in the Golden Horde. Married to the daughter of the Golden Horde Khan Berdibek, he received the title of emir and became the arbiter of the destinies of that part of the Horde, which was located west of the Volga to the Dnieper and in the steppe expanses of the Crimea and Ciscaucasia.
Militia of Grand Duke Dmitry Ivanovich in 1380 Lubok, 17th century.
However, the ambitious Mamai continued to consider the defeat of the Moscow principality, which had escaped subordination, as the main factor in strengthening his own positions in the Horde. In 1376, the Khan of the Blue Horde, Arab Shah Muzzaffar (Arapsha of Russian chronicles), who went over to the service of Mamai, ravaged the Novosilsk principality, but returned back, avoiding a battle with the Moscow army that had gone beyond the Oka border. In 1377 he was on the river. It was not the Moscow-Suzdal army that defeated Pian. The governors sent against the Horde showed carelessness, for which they paid: “And their princes, and boyars, and nobles, and governors, consoling and having fun, drinking and fishing, imagining the existence of the house,” and then ruined the Nizhny Novgorod and Ryazan principalities.
In 1378, Mamai, trying to force him to pay tribute again, sent an army led by Murza Begich to Rus'. The Russian regiments that came out to meet were led by Dmitry Ivanovich himself. The battle took place on August 11, 1378 in Ryazan land, on a tributary of the Oka river. Vozhe. The Horde were completely defeated and fled. The Battle of Vozha showed the increased power of the Russian state emerging around Moscow.
Mamai attracted armed detachments from the conquered peoples of the Volga region and the North Caucasus to participate in the new campaign; his army also included heavily armed infantrymen from the Genoese colonies in the Crimea. The Horde's allies were the Grand Duke of Lithuania Jagiello and the Ryazan Prince Oleg Ivanovich. However, these allies were on their own: Jagiello did not want to strengthen either the Horde or the Russian side, and as a result, his troops never appeared on the battlefield; Oleg Ryazansky entered into an alliance with Mamai, fearing for the fate of his border principality, but he was the first to inform Dmitry about the advance of the Horde troops and did not participate in the battle.
In the summer of 1380 Mamai began his campaign. Not far from the place where the Voronezh River flows into the Don, the Horde set up their camps and, wandering, awaited news from Jagiello and Oleg.
In the terrible hour of danger hanging over the Russian land, Prince Dmitry showed exceptional energy in organizing resistance to the Golden Horde. At his call, military detachments and militias of peasants and townspeople began to gather. All of Rus' rose up to fight the enemy. The gathering of Russian troops was appointed in Kolomna, where the core of the Russian army set out from Moscow. The court of Dmitry himself, the regiments of his cousin Vladimir Andreevich Serpukhovsky and the regiments of the Belozersk, Yaroslavl and Rostov princes walked separately along different roads. The regiments of the Olgerdovich brothers (Andrei Polotsky and Dmitry Bryansky, the Jagiello brothers) also moved to join the troops of Dmitry Ivanovich. The brothers' army included Lithuanians, Belarusians and Ukrainians; citizens of Polotsk, Drutsk, Bryansk and Pskov.
After the troops arrived in Kolomna, a review was held. The assembled army on the Maiden Field was striking in its numbers. The gathering of troops in Kolomna had not only military, but also political significance. The Ryazan prince Oleg finally got rid of his hesitations and abandoned the idea of joining the troops of Mamai and Jagiello. A marching battle formation was formed in Kolomna: Prince Dmitry led the Big Regiment; Serpukhov Prince Vladimir Andreevich with the Yaroslavl people - the regiment of the Right Hand; Gleb Bryansky was appointed commander of the Left Hand regiment; The leading regiment was made up of Kolomna residents.
Saint Sergius of Radonezh blesses Saint Prince Demetrius Donskoy.
Artist S.B. Simakov. 1988
The entire campaign of the Russian army to the Oka was carried out in a relatively short time. The distance from Moscow to Kolomna is about 100 km; the troops covered it in 4 days. They arrived at the mouth of Lopasnya on August 26. Ahead there was a guard guard, which had the task of protecting the main forces from a surprise attack by the enemy.
On August 30, Russian troops began crossing the Oka River near the village of Priluki. Okolnichy Timofey Velyaminov and his detachment monitored the crossing, awaiting the approach of the foot army. On September 4, 30 km from the Don River in the Berezuy tract, the allied regiments of Andrei and Dmitry Olgerdovich joined the Russian army. Once again, the location of the Horde army was clarified, which, awaiting the approach of the allies, was wandering around the Kuzmina Gati.
The movement of the Russian army from the mouth of Lopasnya to the west was intended to prevent the Lithuanian army of Jagiello from uniting with the forces of Mamai. In turn, Jagiello, having learned about the route and number of Russian troops, was in no hurry to unite with the Mongol-Tatars, hovering around Odoev. The Russian command, having received this information, decisively sent troops to the Don, trying to forestall the formation of enemy units and strike at the Mongol-Tatar horde. On September 5, the Russian cavalry reached the mouth of the Nepryadva, which Mamai learned about only the next day.
To develop a plan for further action, on September 6, Prince Dmitry Ivanovich convened a military council. The votes of the council members were divided. Some suggested going beyond the Don and fighting the enemy on the southern bank of the river. Others advised staying on the northern bank of the Don and waiting for the enemy to attack. The final decision depended on the Grand Duke. Dmitry Ivanovich uttered the following significant words: “Brothers! An honest death is better than an evil life. It was better not to go out against the enemy than to come and do nothing and return back. Today we will all cross the Don and there we will lay our heads for the Orthodox faith and our brothers.” The Grand Duke of Vladimir preferred offensive actions that made it possible to maintain the initiative, which was important not only in strategy (hitting the enemy in parts), but also in tactics (choosing the location of the battle and the surprise of a strike on the enemy’s army). After the council in the evening, Prince Dmitry and voivode Dmitry Mikhailovich Bobrok-Volynsky moved beyond the Don and examined the area.
The area chosen by Prince Dmitry for the battle was called Kulikovo Field. On three sides - west, north and east, it was limited by the Don and Nepryadva rivers, cut by ravines and small rivers. The right wing of the Russian army forming into battle formation was covered by the rivers flowing into the Nepryadva (Upper, Middle and Lower Dubiki); on the left is the rather shallow Smolka River, which flows into the Don, and dried-up stream beds (beams with gentle slopes). But this lack of terrain was compensated for - behind Smolka there was a forest in which a general reserve could be placed to guard the fords across the Don and strengthen the wing’s battle formation. Along the front, the Russian position had a length of over eight kilometers (some authors significantly reduce it and then question the number of troops). However, the terrain convenient for enemy cavalry action was limited to four kilometers and was located in the center of the position - near the converging upper reaches of Nizhny Dubik and Smolka. Mamai's army, having an advantage in deployment along a front of more than 12 kilometers, could attack the Russian battle formations with cavalry only in this limited area, which excluded maneuver by cavalry masses.
On the night of September 7, 1380, the crossing of the main forces began. Foot troops and convoys crossed the Don along built bridges, and cavalry forded. The crossing was carried out under the cover of strong guard detachments.
Morning on the Kulikovo field. Artist A.P. Bubnov. 1943–1947.
Battle of Kulikovo. Artist A. Yvon. 1850
Mamai’s army, which arrived on the morning of September 8 and stopped 7-8 kilometers from the Russians, numbered about 90-100 thousand people. It consisted of a vanguard (light cavalry), the main forces (mercenary Genoese infantry were in the center, and heavy cavalry deployed in two lines on the flanks) and a reserve. Light reconnaissance and security detachments scattered in front of the Horde camp. The enemy's plan was to cover the Russian. army from both flanks, and then surround it and destroy it. The main role in solving this problem was assigned to powerful cavalry groups concentrated on the flanks of the Horde army. However, Mamai was in no hurry to join the battle, still hoping for Jagiello’s approach.
But Dmitry Ivanovich decided to draw Mamai’s army into the battle and ordered his regiments to march. The Grand Duke took off his armor, handed it over to boyar Mikhail Brenk, and he himself put on simple armor, but not inferior in its protective properties to the prince’s. The Grand Duke's dark red (black) banner was raised in the Big Regiment - a symbol of honor and glory of the united Russian army. It was handed to Brenk.
Duel between Peresvet and Chelubey. Artist. V.M. Vasnetsov. 1914
For three hours, Mamai’s army unsuccessfully tried to break through the center and right wing of the Russian army. Here the onslaught of the Horde troops was repulsed. Andrei Olgerdovich’s detachment was active. He repeatedly launched a counterattack, helping the center regiments hold back the enemy onslaught.
Then Mamai concentrated his main efforts against the Left Hand regiment. In a fierce battle with a superior enemy, the regiment suffered heavy losses and began to retreat. Dmitry Olgerdovich's reserve detachment was brought into the battle. The warriors took the place of the fallen, trying to hold back the onslaught of the enemy, and only their death allowed the Mongol cavalry to move forward. The soldiers of the Ambush Regiment, seeing the difficult situation of their military brothers-in-arms, were eager to fight. Vladimir Andreevich Serpukhovskoy, who commanded the regiment, decided to join the battle, but his adviser, the experienced governor Bobrok, held the prince back. Mamaev's cavalry, pressing the left wing and breaking through the battle formation of the Russian army, began to go to the rear of the Big Regiment. The Horde, reinforced by fresh forces from the Mamaia reserve, bypassing Green Dubrava, attacked the soldiers of the Big Regiment.
The decisive moment of the battle had arrived. The Ambush Regiment, the existence of which Mamai did not know, rushed into the flank and rear of the Golden Horde cavalry that had broken through. The attack by the Ambush Regiment came as a complete surprise to the Tatars. “I fell into great fear and horror of wickedness... and cried out, saying: “Alas for us!” ... the Christians have become wise over us, the daring and daring princes and governors have left us in hiding and have prepared plans for us that are not tired; our arms are weakened, and the shoulders of the Ustasha, and our knees are numb, and our horses are very tired, and our weapons are worn out; and who can go against them?...” Taking advantage of the emerging success, other regiments also went on the offensive. The enemy fled. Russian squads pursued him for 30-40 kilometers - to the Beautiful Sword River, where the convoy and rich trophies were captured. Mamai's army was completely defeated. It practically ceased to exist.
Returning from the chase, Vladimir Andreevich began to gather an army. The Grand Duke himself was shell-shocked and knocked off his horse, but was able to get to the forest, where he was found unconscious after the battle under a felled birch tree. But the Russian army also suffered heavy losses, amounting to about 20 thousand people.
For eight days the Russian army collected and buried the dead soldiers, and then moved to Kolomna. On September 28, the winners entered Moscow, where the entire population of the city was waiting for them. The Battle of Kulikovo Field was of great importance in the struggle of the Russian people for liberation from the foreign yoke. It seriously undermined the military power of the Golden Horde and accelerated its subsequent collapse. The news that “Great Rus' defeated Mamai on the Kulikovo field” quickly spread throughout the country and far beyond its borders. For his outstanding victory, the people nicknamed Grand Duke Dmitry Ivanovich “Donskoy”, and his cousin, Prince Vladimir Andreevich of Serpukhov, nicknamed him “Brave”.
Jagiello's troops, having not reached the Kulikovo field 30-40 kilometers and having learned about the Russian victory, quickly returned to Lithuania. Mamai’s ally did not want to take risks, since there were many Slavic troops in his army. In the army of Dmitry Ivanovich there were prominent representatives of Lithuanian soldiers who had supporters in Jagiello’s army, and they could go over to the side of the Russian troops. All this forced Jagiello to be as careful as possible in making decisions.
Mamai, abandoning his defeated army, fled with a handful of comrades to Kafa (Feodosia), where he was killed. Khan Tokhtamysh seized power in the Horde. He demanded that Rus' resume the payment of tribute, arguing that in the Battle of Kulikovo it was not the Golden Horde that was defeated, but the usurper of power, Temnik Mamai. Dmitry refused. Then, in 1382, Tokhtamysh undertook a punitive campaign against Rus', captured and burned Moscow by cunning. The largest cities of the Moscow land - Dmitrov, Mozhaisk and Pereyaslavl - were also subjected to merciless destruction, and then the Horde marched through the Ryazan lands with fire and sword. As a result of this raid, Horde rule over Russia was restored.
Dmitry Donskoy on the Kulikovo field. Artist V.K. Sazonov. 1824.
Burial of fallen soldiers after the Battle of Kulikovo.
1380. Front chronicle of the 16th century.
Assessing the results of the Battle of Kulikovo and the activities of Dmitry Donskoy preceding it, a number of modern scientists who have most fully studied this issue do not believe that the Moscow prince set himself the goal of leading the anti-Horde struggle in the broad concept of the word, but only spoke out against Mamai as a usurper of power in Zolotaya Horde. So, A.A. Gorsky writes: “Open disobedience to the Horde, which developed into an armed struggle against it, occurred during a period when power there fell into the hands of an illegitimate ruler (Mamai). With the restoration of “legitimate” power, an attempt was made to limit ourselves to a purely nominal, without payment of tribute, recognition of the supremacy of the “king,” but the military defeat of 1382 thwarted this. Nevertheless, the attitude towards foreign power has changed: it has become obvious that, under certain conditions, its non-recognition and successful military opposition to the Horde are possible.” Therefore, as other researchers note, despite the fact that protests against the Horde occur within the framework of previous ideas about the relationship between the Russian princes - “ulusniks” and the Horde “kings”, “The Battle of Kulikovo undoubtedly became a turning point in the formation of a new self-awareness of the Russians people,” and “the victory on the Kulikovo field secured Moscow’s role as the organizer and ideological center of the reunification of the East Slavic lands, showing that the path to their state-political unity was the only path to their liberation from foreign domination.”
Monument-column, made according to the design of A.P. Bryullov at the Ch. Berd plant.
Installed on the Kulikovo field in 1852 on the initiative of the first explorer
battles of the Chief Prosecutor of the Holy Synod S. D. Nechaev.
September 21 (September 8 according to the Julian calendar) in accordance with the Federal Law of March 13, 1995 No. 32-FZ “On Days of Military Glory and Memorable Dates of Russia” is the Day of Military Glory of Russia - Victory Day of the Russian regiments led by Grand Duke Dmitry Donskoy over the Mongol-Tatar troops in the Battle of Kulikovo.
A chronicle collection called the Patriarchal or Nikon Chronicle. PSRL. T. XI. St. Petersburg, 1897. P. 27.
Quote by: Borisov N.S. And the candle would not go out... Historical portrait of Sergius of Radonezh. M., 1990. P.222.
Nikon Chronicle. PSRL. T. XI. P. 56.
Kirpichnikov A.N. Battle of Kulikovo. L., 1980. P. 105.
This number was calculated by the Soviet military historian E.A. Razin based on the total population of Russian lands, taking into account the principles of recruiting troops for all-Russian campaigns. See: Razin E.A. History of military art. T. 2. St. Petersburg, 1994. P. 272. The same number of Russian troops is determined by A.N. Kirpichnikov. See: Kirpichnikov A.N. Decree. op. P. 65. In the works of historians of the 19th century. this number varies from 100 thousand to 200 thousand people. See: Karamzin N.M. History of Russian Goverment. T.V.M., 1993.S. 40; Ilovaisky D.I. Collectors of Rus'. M., 1996. P. 110.; Soloviev S.M. History of Russia from ancient times. Book 2. M., 1993. P. 323. Russian chronicles provide extremely exaggerated data on the number of Russian troops: Resurrection Chronicle - about 200 thousand. See: Resurrection Chronicle. PSRL. T. VIII. St. Petersburg, 1859. P. 35; Nikon Chronicle - 400 thousand. See: Nikon Chronicle. PSRL. T. XI. P. 56.
See: Skrynnikov R.G. Battle of Kulikovo // Battle of Kulikovo in the cultural history of our Motherland. M., 1983. S. 53-54.
Nikon Chronicle. PSRL. T. XI. P. 60.
Right there. P. 61.
“Zadonshchina” talks about the flight of Mamai himself-nine to the Crimea, that is, about the death of 8/9 of the entire army in the battle. See: Zadonshchina // Military stories of Ancient Rus'. L., 1986. P. 167.
See: The Legend of Mamaev’s Massacre // Military Tales of Ancient Rus'. L., 1986. P. 232.
Kirpichnikov A.N. Decree. op. P. 67, 106. According to E.A. Razin’s Horde lost about 150 thousand, the Russians killed and died from wounds - about 45 thousand people (See: Razin E.A. Op. cit. T. 2. pp. 287–288). B. Urlanis speaks of 10 thousand killed (See: Urlanis B.Ts. History of military losses. St. Petersburg, 1998. P. 39). The “Tale of the Massacre of Mamaev” says that 653 boyars were killed. See: Military stories of Ancient Rus'. P. 234. The figure given there for the total number of dead Russian combatants of 253 thousand is clearly overestimated.
Gorsky A.A. Moscow and Horde. M. 2000. P. 188.
Danilevsky I.N. Russian lands through the eyes of contemporaries and descendants (XII-XIV centuries). M. 2000. P. 312.
Shabuldo F.M. The lands of Southwestern Rus' as part of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. Kyiv, 1987. P. 131.
The Battle of Kulikovo (Donskoe or Mamaevo Massacre) is a decisive battle between the united Russian army under the command of the Moscow Grand Duke Dmitry Ivanovich Donskoy and the army of the Golden Horde backer Mamai. The battle took place on September 8 (September 21), 1380 on the Kulikovo field, between the Don, Nepryadva and Krasivaya Mecheya rivers, in the southwestern part of the Epifansky district of the Tula province, on an area of about 10 square kilometers.
With the beginning of the “Great Silence” in the Horde in 1362, with its almost annual changes of khans, the relations of the Russian princes with the Golden Horde “kings” changed significantly. The weakening of the central government in the Horde made it possible, first of all, for Moscow Prince Dmitry to pursue an increasingly independent policy. After 3 clashes in 1368, 1370 and 1372, Moscow was able to stop the onslaught of Lithuania; in 1375, an agreement was concluded with Tver, directly directed against the Tatars. And already in the spring of 1376, the Russian army led by D.M. Bobrok-Volynsky invaded the middle Volga (Bulgar cities), took a ransom of 5,000 rubles from the Horde henchmen and planted Russian customs officers there. Temnik Mamai, who by that time had significantly strengthened his power and influence, could not help but react to this.
1377 - the Khan of the Blue Horde, Arab Shah (Tsarevich Arapsha in Russian chronicles), who went into the service of Mamai, defeated the united Nizhny Novgorod-Moscow army on the Piana River, plundered Nizhny Novgorod and Ryazan. And the next year, Mamai, inspired by this success, sent one of his best commanders, Murza Begich, against the Moscow prince himself. But in the battle on the Vozha River, the Tatar army was completely defeated, and Begich himself was killed.
This shook Mamai’s position in the Horde (especially since a very dangerous contender for the throne appeared - the natural Chingizid Tokhtamysh), and he began active preparations for the decisive battle. Russian chronicles say that Mamai intended to repeat Batu’s campaign and destroy the Russian lands so that they would not be able to rise. Mamai gathered all possible forces, entered into a political alliance with the Lithuanian prince Jagiello, and tried to win over the Ryazan prince Oleg. A terrible threat looms over the Russian lands.
It is quite difficult to judge the number of Mamai troops. It is known for sure that there were 4,000 mercenary Genoese infantry, that Mamai collected reinforcements from all the territories under his control: the militia of the Yasses and Kasogs - residents of the North Caucasus - took part in the battle. The description of the battle also speaks of 3 Tatar temniks who stood with Mamai on the Red Hill. In “The Tale of the Massacre of Mamai” it is said about 800,000 Mamai’s army, which, of course, is a gigantic exaggeration. However, all the sources known to us say with confidence that Mamai’s army was larger than the Russian one. I think we can agree with the number of 80,000.
Having received news of the advance of Mamaev's hordes, Prince Dmitry announced a gathering of the all-Russian militia. A review of the Russian troops was scheduled in Kolomna on August 15, 1380. The core of the Russian army set out from Moscow to Kolomna - in three parts along three roads. Separately, the court of Dmitry himself moved, separately the regiments of his cousin Vladimir Andreevich Serpukhovsky, and separately the regiments of the assistants of the Belozersk, Yaroslavl and Rostov princes.
Representatives of almost all lands of North-Eastern Rus' took part in the all-Russian gathering. In addition to the henchmen of the princes, troops arrived from the Nizhny Novgorod-Suzdal, Tver and Smolensk great principalities. Already in Kolomna, the primary battle order was formed: Dmitry began to lead a large regiment; Vladimir Andreevich - right-hand regiment; Gleb Bryansky was appointed commander of the left-hand regiment; The leading regiment was made up of Kolomna residents. There are significant discrepancies regarding the quantitative composition of the Russian army, but modern historians believe that the number of 60,000 people is closer to the truth.
St. Sergius blesses Dmitry for the fight against Mamai
In addition, Mamai hoped to join forces with the Grand Duke of Lithuania Jagiello and Oleg Ryazansky against Moscow, while he assumed that Dmitry would not risk withdrawing troops beyond the Oka, but would take a defensive position on its northern bank, as he had already done in 1373 and 1379 gg. The connection of allied forces on the southern bank of the Oka was planned for September 14.
But the Moscow prince, realizing the danger of this unification, on August 26 quickly led his army to the mouth of Lopasnya and crossed the Oka River to the Ryazan borders. It should be noted that he led the army to the Don not along the shortest route, but along an arc west of the central regions of the Ryazan principality. On the way to the Don, in the Berezuy tract, regiments of the Lithuanian princes Andrei and Dmitry Olgerdovich were added to the Russian troops. At the last moment, the Novgorodians joined the Russian army.
On the night of September 7, the Russian army crossed the Don, thereby essentially cutting off its path to retreat. On the evening of September 7, they were lined up in battle formations. The large regiment and Dmitry's entire courtyard stood in the center. They were commanded by the Moscow okolnichy Timofey Velyaminov. On the flanks were located a regiment of the right hand under the command of the Lithuanian prince Andrei Olgerdovich and a regiment of the left hand of princes Vasily Yaroslavsky and Theodore of Molozhsky. Ahead in front of the large regiment was the guard regiment of princes Simeon Obolensky and John of Tarusa. An ambush regiment was placed in an oak grove up the Don under the command of Prince Vladimir Andreevich and Dmitry Mikhailovich Bobroko-Volynsky.
1380, September 8, morning - it was foggy. Until 11 o'clock, until the fog cleared, the troops stood ready for battle, maintaining communication with the sounds of trumpets. Dmitry again traveled around the regiments, often changing horses. At 12 o'clock the Tatars also appeared on the Kulikovo field. The Battle of Kulikovo began with several small skirmishes of the advanced detachments, after which the legendary duel between the Tatar Chelubey (or Telebey) and the monk Alexander Peresvet took place. Both fighters fell dead (it may very well be that this episode, described only in “The Tale of the Massacre of Mamaev,” is a legend).
Then followed the battle of the guard regiment with the vanguard of the Tatars, led by the military leader Telyak. The Moscow prince was first in a guard regiment, and then joined the ranks of a large regiment, exchanging clothes and horses with the Moscow boyar Mikhail Andreevich Brenok, who then fought and died under the banner of the Grand Duke.
In the middle of the day the Tatars went on the attack with all their strength. The combined attack of the professional Genoese infantry and Tatar cavalry was terrible. An extremely fierce battle ensued. The Russian guard regiment was almost completely destroyed. In the center and on the left flank, the Russians were on the verge of breaking through their battle formations; the situation could only be saved by a counterattack by Gleb Bryansky. On the right flank, the Tatar attack was unsuccessful. Then Mamai directed the main blow to the left-hand regiment. As a result, this regiment was unable to maintain formation, broke away from the large regiment and began to retreat to Nepryadva; the Tatars pursued him, a threat arose to the rear of the Russian large regiment, the Russian army was pushed back to the river, and the Russian battle formations were completely mixed up.
Sometimes they write that this was a tactical idea of the Russians, who lured the Tatars into the attack of an ambush regiment. But it’s hard to believe, because by doing so the Tatars broke through to the rear of a large regiment, and to take such a risk... Perhaps a false retreat was intended, but at some point it became quite real. However, perhaps this is precisely what was able to convince the Tatars that victory was very close, and they became carried away in pursuit of the retreating Russians.
Vladimir Andreevich, who commanded the ambush regiment, proposed to strike earlier, but Voivode Bobrok held him back, and when the Tatars broke through to the river and exposed the rear to the ambush regiment, he ordered to engage in battle. The cavalry attack from an ambush from the rear on the main forces of the Mongols became decisive. The Mongol cavalry was driven into the river and killed there. At the same time, the right-flank regiments of Andrei and Dmitry Olgerdovich went on the offensive. The Tatars became confused and fled.
A turning point came in the Battle of Kulikovo. Mamai, who watched the progress of the battle from afar and saw the defeat, fled with small forces as soon as the Russian ambush regiment entered the battle. There was no one to regroup the Tatar forces, continue the battle, or at least cover the retreat. Therefore, the entire Tatar army fled.
The ambush regiment pursued the Tatars 50 versts to the Beautiful Sword River, “beating up” “countless numbers” of them. Returning from the chase, Vladimir Andreevich began to gather an army. Grand Duke Dmitry Donskoy himself was wounded and knocked off his horse, but was able to get to the forest, where he was found unconscious after the battle.
Losses on both sides were very large. Of course, one cannot believe the absolutely incredible figures of the “Tale...”, which speaks of hundreds of thousands of deaths. But even according to the most conservative estimates, the Russians lost at least a third (and maybe half) of their troops. The fleeing Mamai was able to save only 1/9 of the army, but it is possible that the bulk of the Tatars still fled and did not die. Nevertheless, the victory of the Russian army was complete and unconditional.
From September 9 to 16, the dead were buried; a church was erected on the common grave (it no longer exists for a long time). The Russians stood on the battlefield for eight days, burying their fallen soldiers.
In disputes about the historical significance of the victory in the Battle of Kulikovo, historians break their spears to this day. We are closer to the point of view of F.M. Shabuldo: “The defeat of the main forces of the Mamaev Horde in the battle on the Kulikovo field on September 8, 1380 was a turning point in the struggle of Rus' against the Golden Horde, whose military power and political dominance were dealt a serious blow, which accelerated its collapse into less significant state formations. Another foreign policy opponent of the Grand Duchy of Moscow, the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, also entered a period of hopeless crisis. The victory in the Battle of Kulikovo secured Moscow’s importance as the organizer and ideological center of the reunification of the East Slavic lands, showing that the path to their state-political unity was the only path to their liberation from foreign domination.”
Battle of Kulikovo, which occurred on September 8, 1380 between the Russian army of Prince Dmitry Ivanovich and the Tatar hordes of Mamai, became a turning point in Russian history. And although Muscovite Rus', as a result of the battle, was freed from the Horde yoke for only two years, the Battle of Kulikovo led to the mental unification of Rus' and marked the beginning of the formation of the Great Russian nation - if at Kulikovo field They went, being Muscovites, Vladimir, Mozhaisians, Serpukhovites and Novgorodians, then returned from there as Russians.
Background to the Battle of Kulikovo
Popular uprisings against The Tatar yoke began to break out immediately after its establishment. So, in 1259, the residents of Novgorod dealt with the insolent Horde Baskaks. and in 1262 the inhabitants of Rostov the Great, Vladimir, Suzdal and many other Russian cities rose up against the oppressors. However, the Horde invariably drowned these actions in blood, since the Russian princes were on their side.
Many are now trying to claim that the Tatar yoke is over There was no Rus'. The Tatars, they say, did not keep garrisons in Russian cities, but only limited themselves to punitive expeditions against the rebel cities. Yes, indeed, they did not keep garrisons in the cities - the obedience of the Russian people to the Tatar power was ensured by the Russian princes themselves, and therefore the Tatar yoke was doubly burdensome - it was necessary to support not only the khan in the Sarai, but also the prince in the Kremlin.
The princes themselves repeatedly brought Tatar detachments to Rus', using them both to restore order in their inheritance and to attack neighboring principalities. In addition, the Tatars themselves often used some Russian princes in the fight against others. So, in 1333, the Tatars went with the Muscovites to the Novgorod land, which refused to pay an increased tribute. In 1334, together with Dmitry Bryansky, the Tatars went against the Smolensk prince Ivan Alexandrovich.
But on November 13, 1359, after the death of Ivan the Red, nine-year-old Dmitry Ivanovich became the Grand Duke of Vladimir and Moscow. In the early years, Moscow was ruled on his behalf by Metropolitan Alexy, who was a supporter of an alliance with the Horde against Lithuania. Objectively, this policy was correct: the Tatars looked at Rus' only as a cash cow, and Lithuania as an object of genocide. Subjectively, this policy of the Metropolitan was caused by the fact that it was Berdibek, and not some Jagiello, who issued Alexy a label confirming the liberation of the Russian Church from tributes and extortions.
However, in the same year 1359, the twelfth khan of the Golden Horde, Berdybek, was killed. The impostor Kulpa, who took his place, stayed in Sarai for five months and was killed by Nauryzbek, who four months later was killed by Khan Khyzyr. But Khyzyr, after the same four months, became a victim of a conspiracy by his own eldest son Timur-Hadji. The latter ruled for five weeks, having only managed to mint a coin with his name. In total, over the next 10 years, 25 khans changed in Sarai.
Temnik Mamai, who served as governor of Crimea under Berdybek, took advantage of this situation. This representative of the Kyyat tribe did not have any rights to the Horde throne, but was married to the daughter of Berdybek - the last representative of the legitimate dynasty, descending from Batu. In addition, an eight-year-old representative of the Baty family, Muhammad-Bulak, was on vacation in Crimea at that moment.
Having proclaimed this boy khan, Mamai declared himself regent of the entire Golden Horde. However, he could not control the entire Horde - Sarai and the entire eastern part of the Horde were under the control of other khans, and from 1377 Timur’s protege Genghisid Tokhtamysh began to take control of it.
Taking advantage of the situation in the Horde, called the Great Zamyatnya by the chroniclers, Prince Dmitry decided not to send tribute to Sarai anymore.
But Lithuania also decided to take advantage of the situation in the Horde: the Lithuanian prince Olgerd Gedeminvich, married to the daughter of the Tver prince Alexander Mikhailovich Ulyana, who was killed in the Horde, declared himself the liberator of Russian lands from the Tatar yoke. The aura of a liberator and an appearance similar to the Russians, as well as a Russian wife and Orthodox religion, allowed him to take possession of Bryansk, Kiev, Smolensk and all of Volyn in a short time. It seemed that he was about to take over the entire former Kievan Rus, but Moscow unexpectedly stood in the way of his plans.
In alliance with the Tver princes, Olgerd began a war against Dmitry. Three times the Lithuanian prince went to Moscow, but he was unable to take it. At the height of the confrontation, on May 24, 1377, 80-year-old Olgerd died. His 15-year-old heir Jagiello was unable not only to expand, but also to maintain most of his father’s conquests - one principality fell away from Lithuania after another. And then Jagiello decided to offer the Tatars, Lithuania’s recent enemies, an alliance against Dmitry. The condition of this union was the support of Mamai in his claims to the Horde throne and the division of Rus' between Lithuania and the Horde.
For Mama, this alliance could not have come at a better time: from the very beginning of his reign, he sought to make North-Eastern Rus' not just a dependent territory, but also to completely occupy and annex it. In this desire, he was indulged by Crimean Jews (not to be confused with the Karaites) and Genoese merchants, mostly of the same nationality, sometimes covered with a Catholic cross. Both of them intended to open trading posts in Rus' to exchange furs for Italian glass. Hoping for future dividends, they generously loaned money to Mamai, who managed to gather quite significant military forces. They were also interested in the ruin of Moscow for the reason that in the spring of 1376, the Russian army led by Dmitry Mikhailovich Bobrok-Volynsky made a campaign against the middle Volga, defeated Volga Bulgaria and, instead of Mamaev’s henchmen, put Russian customs officers there. thus, the influx of furs to Crimean merchants decreased.
It completely dried up after the next winter, Prince Boris Konstantinovich Gorodetsky, together with his nephew Semyon Dmitrievich and the Moscow governor Sviblo, carried out a campaign in the Mordovian land. All Bulgarian and Mordovian furs now went to Rus' and were sold through Novgorod to the Hanseatic cities.
To resume the supply of furs to Crimea, Mamai sent an army to Rus' under the command of Murza Begich, but this army was completely defeated on August 11, 1378 Battle of the Vozhe River. Begich himself also died.
Preparation for the Battle of Kulikovo
For the next two years, the opponents prepared for the decisive battle. Finally, on July 23, 1380, a messenger Andrei Semenovich Popov galloped to Moscow with the news that an army led by Mamai himself had crossed the Voronezh River.
Letters were immediately sent to all the capitals of the Russian principalities, cities and lands: “let them be ready.” Kolomna, a fortress near the mouth of the Moscow River, was designated as the location for the concentration of the main forces of the Russian army.
Soon, Russian intelligence officers Rodion Rzhevsky, Andrei Volosatov and Vasily Tupik managed to obtain a tongue, according to whose testimony it became clear that Jagiello and Oleg Ryazansky.
Recently, a theory has emerged suggesting that Battle of Kulikovo happened not on the Don at all, but right under the walls of Moscow in the area of what is now Moscow Solyanka Street. From the point of view of formal logic, everything in this theory looks perfect: why chase Mamai in an open field, risking that he will go around from the rear and ruin defenseless Moscow? Isn't it better to meet him under the walls of the city if he is going to Moscow anyway?
However, this theory does not take into account the fact that in this case not only Mamai, but also Jagiello and Oleg Ryazansky would come to Moscow. Dmitry wanted to break up the opponents piece by piece, forestalling their connection.
On the morning of August 20, the Russian army set out from Moscow along three roads. To defend the capital, Voivode Fyodor Andreevich Koshka, a distant ancestor of the future Romanov family, was left with the army.
Rus' fielded 24 thousand warriors of heavily armed infantry from city regiments, replenished with volunteer peasants, and about 12 thousand mounted knights against Mamai.
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Russian horse warrior |
The knights and their war horses were covered from head to toe in iron armor. Long-range crossbows were attached to the saddles of the knights, firing iron arrows at 800–1000 m, while the Horde bow, according to my information, hit only at a distance of 150–200 m. Each Russian knight was fluent in the techniques of throwing and hand-to-hand combat, and habitually felt himself in heavy armor, since he was taught military affairs from the age of three.
The infantry men-at-arms were armed with crossbows, swords, axes and spears, and according to some information there were also a small number of arquebuses that fired not only bullets, but also arrows. The infantrymen were protected by armor and chain mail with bracers, metal gloves, leg guards, knee pads and leggings, plate boots, helmets with steel faces, and scarlet almond-shaped shields.
The Russian army included regiments under the command of twenty-three princes and governors, including the Tver regiment. For various reasons, there were no regiments from Smolensk, Nizhny Novgorod, Novgorod and, of course, Ryazan. But on the other hand, two Orthodox Lithuanian princes, his half-brothers who were in opposition to Jogaila, sent their squads. These were Andrei, who reigned in Pskov, and Dmitry, to whose inheritance Olgerd at one time allocated Bryansk and the Trubetskoy principality. This same Dmitry Olgerdovich became the founder of the Trubetskoy princes. It was to meet with these detachments that Dmitry Ivanovich, leaving Kolomna with his army on the 24th, did not move directly towards Mamai, but first headed west along the Oka to the mouth of Lopasnya. In addition, already knowing about Oleg Ryazansky’s betrayal, he did not dare to move through the center of the Ryazan principality, although the battle itself took place on Ryazan territory.
After crossing the Oka River near Lopasnya, Dmitry and his military leaders had to decide which enemy should be met first. The Grand Duke took into account that Jagiello and Oleg were advancing in a narrow zone, mainly along roads, and therefore their army did not cause much damage to the local population. Mamai is a different matter. Nomads, greedy for prey, promised great troubles to Russian villages, towns and villages. Therefore, having decided to beat the enemies separately, Dmitry wanted first of all to knock the Horde out of the coalition.
Dmitry Ivanovich hastened to cross the Don at an unusual time according to the then rules of war - at night. And in this risky enterprise there was a deep calculation: realizing that Mamai could know quite a lot about the Moscow army from the spies, Dmitry hoped that the night crossing would eliminate the possibility of a surprise attack on his rear by one of the opponents, and the next day the warriors would have time to prepare for battle.
Kulikovo fieldProgress of the Battle of Kulikovo
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Pavesiere
Tatar horseman |
In the morning September 8, 1380 Two troops lined up on the Kulikovo field: 36 thousand Russian soldiers were opposed by 120 thousand Horde soldiers. The location of the Russian troops was covered by Semyon Melik's Watch Regiment, which numbered up to a thousand mounted knights in damask armor. Behind it were the Foredovoy and Bolshaya Polny, in the ranks of which there were 24 thousand foot warriors. Their flanks were covered by the regiments of the Right and Left Hands, which included 3-4 thousand each of heavily armed forged troops, seated in thick armor on armored horses. In the rear of the Great Regiment, Dmitry prudently deployed 3,600 reserve warriors, not far from which fluttered the grand ducal banner, defended by three hundred warriors. On the left, in the oak grove, the Ambush Regiment, consisting of 4 thousand knights Dmitry Bobrok and Vladimir Serpukhovsky, was waiting in the wings.
Mamai’s army was also not purely cavalry - it also included Genoese infantrymen . They were recruited not only in the Crimean Cafe, but also in Genoa itself. Some of them were pikemen, and the rest were crossbowmen. pavesiere ami - while loading the crossbow, they covered themselves with a standing shield stuck into the ground, called paveza. Each of them had two crossbows, plate armor and a gorget, iron bracers and bascinet, a sword and a dagger. For every 25 people there was a commander who received 10 florins per month. An ordinary crossbowman received five florins.
Using the main light weapon to hit a moving target. At a trot, the rider is able to reach speeds of up to 12–15 km/h. in this case, the nomads usually began shooting from five hundred steps, rapidly approaching the enemy.
The battle began at about 11 o'clock in the morning with a duel between the Horde giant Chelubey and the Russian knight Peresvet. Both our knight and the Tatar warrior died, killing each other, after which Mamai moved his advanced detachment of 4,4 thousand light cavalry towards the Sentinel Regiment. Behind him, 14–15 thousand dismounted, heavily armed horsemen were preparing for an attack.
Semyon's guard regiment sowed and mostly destroyed the light cavalry of the Horde advanced detachment, but then the main enemy forces entered the battle. The Tatars, at full gallop, crashed into the thick chains of Muscovites who had put out their spears. Tatar horses jumped over spears, and Tatar horsemen cut right and left with crooked sabers. individual daredevils stood with their backs to each other, put out spears, formed hedgehog formations, and successfully fought back. Then the Tatars, without coming close, began to shoot them with bows. Thus, having become greatly thinned out, the Advanced Regiment withdrew, joining the regiments of the Right and Left Hands.
On the right flank, the Russian knights successfully repelled the attacks of the Mamaev horsemen with iron arrows. In the center of the Big and Advanced regiments they also rained down a hail of arrows on the approaching Horde soldiers.
. Every eight seconds, volleys of 4-6 thousand crossbows tore through the air, and yet the enemy cavalry was in their zone of action for at least 10 minutes, and the clumsy 50-rank infantry from the Genoese mercenaries for at least 25 minutes. And those who managed to break through to the Advance Detachment were met by the steel bristles of spears.On the left flank, the right wing of the Horde, reinforced by a reserve, attacked our Left Hand regiment, trying to go to the rear of the Big Regiment. Here, Prince Dmitry Ivanovich fought in the front row. Mamai threw the weight of reserves into battle. The Tatars, regardless of the enormous losses, went ahead.
In the center of the fighting, fierce slaughter continued, the Horde partly crashed into the ranks of the Advanced and Big regiments. At the same time, under the pressure of superior enemy forces, the thinned regiment of the Left Hand retreated back, and the Grand Duke's warriors of the Moscow banner entered the battle. Mamai, seeing that the hour was not far when the main forces of the Russians would be captured and surrounded, celebrated the victory. However, in front of the enemy who had broken through, foot soldiers of the reserve suddenly appeared, blocking his path with a wall of shields bristling with spears. Iron arrows fired from crossbows mowed down hundreds of Horde soldiers.
And at that moment, an Ambush attack fell on the Horde from behind. Now the enemy, who had already lost many soldiers, found himself between a rock and a hard place - he was destroyed from three sides by Russian warriors and knights. The Horde couldn’t bear this and started to run away. At the same time, the heavily armed regiment of the Right Arm went on the offensive, scattering the light enemy horsemen. Now the Russians surrounded the main forces of Mamai, defeated them and went into pursuit, destroying those fleeing for almost 50 miles to the Red Sword River, covering the entire path with Tatar corpses. And on the Beautiful Sword the same thing happened that Mamaev’s warriors had already experienced on Vozha: heavy weapons pulled to the bottom those who wanted to cross the river.
Results of the Battle of Kulikovo
Dmitry Ivanovich himself was later named for the Kulikovo victory Dmitry Donskoy, was shell-shocked and knocked off his horse, but was able to get to the forest, where he was found after the battle under a felled birch tree in an unconscious state. The Russians also got the entire huge convoy, on which Mamai kept everything that was necessary for the army, and, in addition, hoped to take out Moscow booty on it. Having learned about the defeat of Mamai, Jagiello, who did not have time to get to the battle site, turned back and returned to Lithuania as quickly as if he were being followed on his heels. For a long time it was believed that the Russians lost almost their entire army on the Kulikovo Field. However, according to the calculations of military historian Dmitry Zenin, Russian losses amounted to 6% of personnel. that is, a little more than two thousand people. Mamai lost more than a hundred thousand soldiers, and the Genoese infantry - both pikemen and pavesiers - were almost completely exterminated - most of them were trampled by the horses of the fleeing Tatars. The carts from the captured Tatar convoy were useful for loading the wounded, but on the way back, Oleg of Ryazan’s army of five thousand attacked this convoy and, having cut off the wounded, took for themselves all the trophies obtained by the Russians on the Kulikovo field. The defeated Mamai fled to Crimea, managed to gather a new army there and again went to Rus', but on the way on the Kalka River, where in 1223 the
Mamai's army was completely defeated. Among the dead was Khan Muhammad-Bulak, who had reached the age of 28 by that time, under whom Mamai declared himself regent.
Dmitry Donskoy sent Tokhtamysh a greeting message on the occasion of his accession to the throne and sent him generous gifts, but did not ask him for a label to reign. Therefore, Tokhtamysh made a campaign against Moscow in 1382, after a long siege, he took it by deception and burned it to the ground. The Horde yoke in Rus' was restored and lasted for another century.
Let's continue the topic...
The Battle of Kulikovo in 1380 is traditionally considered one of the largest battles of the late Middle Ages, both in significance and scope. Without touching on the first, let us dwell in more detail on its second aspect - its scope, trying to assess the number of troops deployed by Dmitry Ivanovich and his vassals on the Kulikovo Field.
In conditions where no precise instructions have been preserved regarding the mobilization potential of the north-eastern Russian principalities, no military registers, much less the list of Russian “regiments” in the battle, any considerations regarding the size of the troops of Dmitry Ivanovich and his allies will be of an evaluative nature. However, a discussion of this problem will make it possible to determine some framework restrictions within which the number of coalition troops can be considered more or less reasonable, not fantastic, and will be close to real.
In the domestic historiography of the Battle of Kulikovo, the range of estimates of the number of Russian troops is very large - from 100-150 thousand to 30-50 or even less than 1 thousand fighters.
So how much was it really?
Pre-revolutionary historical science adhered to the first meaning. Thus, V. Tatishchev cites in his “Russian History” a figure of 400 thousand, M. Shcherbatov – 200 thousand, N. Karamzin believed that Dmitry Ivanovich’s army consisted of “more than 150 thousand horsemen and foot soldiers. S. Soloviev gives the same amount, who compares the battle with “the massacre of Catalonia, where the Roman commander saved Western Europe from the Huns.” In “too 100 thousand” the number of Dmitry Ivanovich’s army was determined by D. Ilovaisky. Russian military historians, for example, P. Geisman and the authors of the collective work on Russian military history “Russian Military Force”, adhered to the same point of view.
For a long time, Soviet historiography was dominated by the old estimate of the size of the Russian army at 100-150 thousand fighters. This was the opinion, for example, of the authors of the collective “Essays on the History of the USSR,” who referred to chronicle evidence, and L. Cherepnin. The same figure was adhered to much later in the essay “Military Art” in the collective work “Essays on Russian Culture of the XIII-XV Centuries” by B. Rybakov.
Meanwhile, E. Razin, in his classic “History of Military Art,” came to the conclusion that “the total number of the Russian army probably did not exceed 50-60 thousand people.” This assessment was revised downward by one of the most authoritative experts on the history of Russian military affairs of the Middle Ages, A. Kirpichnikov. He believed that at most 36 thousand warriors gathered on the Kulikovo field from Dmitry Ivanovich’s side, since an army of a larger size (100 or more thousand) would have been “an uncontrollable crowd of people who only interfered with each other.” The opinion of S. Veselovsky stands apart, who noted that on the Kulikovo field there were 5-6 thousand people on the Russian side. "at the front." Today, attempts have been made to even more radically review the size of the Russian army. For example, A. Bulychev believed that the Russian army could have about 1-1.5 thousand horsemen, and the entire army, together with servants and transporters, amounted to 6-10 thousand people.
This range of estimates is not surprising, given the unsatisfactory state of the sources on the history of the 1380 campaign. At first glance, quite a lot of them have been preserved - these are both chronicle evidence and literary works. But their value is by no means equal. Regarding the first group of sources, chronicles, it should be noted here that the first, brief, version of the chronicle legend about the battle, originally placed on the pages of the Trinity Chronicle, written in Moscow - “About the Great Massacre on the Don”, appears at the beginning of the 15th century, that is, very soon after the battle itself. This story came to us in the Rogozh chronicler and in the Simeonovskaya chronicle. Around the same time, a story was compiled and placed on the pages of the Novgorod First Chronicle, junior edition. But, alas, all these chronicles provide virtually no specific information about the purely military aspects of the battle. The lengthy chronicle story, contained, for example, in the Resurrection Chronicle, was created much later and bears the imprint of the influence of the literary tradition of covering the Battle of Kulikovo that had formed by that time and has a pronounced journalistic character.
More interesting, at first glance, are the literary monuments - primarily “Zadonshchina” and the famous “The Tale of the Massacre of Mamayev.” The first monument was created, as many researchers believe, at the end of the 1380s or at the very beginning of the 1390s, i.e. directly immediately after the battle. However, alas, it has not reached us in its original form and, due to the peculiarities of the genre, neither “Zadonshchina”, nor even more so the later “Tale”, created, apparently, at the end of the 15th or at the very beginning of the 16th century, do not inspire confidence. While outlining the general picture of events quite fully, they give clearly inflated figures about the number of fighters on both sides. Thus, “Zadonshchina” (according to the Synodal list) gives us a figure of 300 thousand “forged army,” and “The Legend” (in the Cyprian edition) gives us a total of 400 thousand “horse and foot troops.”
And since the sources at our disposal do not allow us to draw any definite conclusions about the strength of the Russian army on the Kulikovo Field, it remains to resort to calculations based on indirect evidence from both modern sources containing more or less accurate information about the peculiarities of military affairs of that time, and and data from archeology and paleogeography.
In order to get an idea of the approximate framework values for the size of Dmitry Ivanovich’s army, you can look at the number of military contingents that the princes and individual “lands” had at the end of the 14th – 1st half of the 15th centuries.
In relation to the 1st half of the 15th century, such data exists, and they seem quite plausible. So, on July 3, 1410, 150 Russian soldiers under the command of the governor of the Nizhny Novgorod prince Danila Borisovich Semyon Karamyshev and the same number of Tatars Tsarevich Talych took Vladimir and plundered it to the ground. The rival of Vasily the Dark, Dmitry Shemyaka, had about 500 nobles in 1436.
In 1418, the Lithuanian prince Ostrozhsky freed the Lithuanian prince Svidrigailo from imprisonment with 500 “nobles”. Another Lithuanian prince, Alexander Czartoryski, not wanting to swear allegiance to Vasily II, left Pskov in 1461 and took with him “... the court of his forged army, 300 fighting people, including the Koshovs...”.
The Pskovites in 1426, during the conflict with the Grand Duke of Lithuania Vytautas, sent 50 people to the aid of the besieged Opochka “tackle army”, and the main Pskov army, led by posadniks Selivester Leontyevich and Fyodor Shibalkin, entered into battle with Vytautas’s troops, having at their disposal 400 fighters. Prince Vasily Yuryevich took Vologda in 1435, having a “squad” of 300 people.
10 years later, in the winter of 1444-45, the Litvins came to the western borders of the Moscow state in retaliation for the Russian campaign against Kaluga. The nobles of the appanage princes of Mozhaisk - 100 people, Vereisky - another 100 people and Borovsky - 60 people - followed them. According to other sources, there were only 300 of them. Lithuanian chronicles speak of 500 Muscovites.
Finally, in the notorious battle of Suzdal in the summer of 1445, in which Vasily II was defeated by the Tatars and captured, his “regiment”, together with the “regiments” of his vassals, princes Ivan Mozhaisky, Mikhail Vereisky and Vasily Serpukhovsky, numbered less than 1 thousand horsemen, and The Vladimir “regiment” of governor Alexei Ignatievich, which came to their aid, consisted of 500 soldiers. According to the chronicler, the Tatars who opposed them were 3.5 thousand.
Thus, the number of “regiments” in the 1st half of the 15th century, i.e. in fact, immediately after the Battle of Kulikovo, it was measured in hundreds, at best a little more than 1 thousand fighters. The princely “courts” number several hundred horsemen, usually from 300 to 500, but no more, the Vladimir “city” “regiment” (and Vladimir is not one of the last cities in these places) - also 500, and separate detachments of small patrimonial detainees from appanages do not exceed hundreds.
Knowing the approximate order of numbers (tens and hundreds, but not thousands of soldiers), let us now turn to the composition of the Russian army. The latest and most reasonable attempt to analyze it was made by A. Gorsky. Having compared the information contained in chronicles and stories about the composition of Dmitry Ivanovich’s army and comparing it with data from the campaigns of 1375 and 1386/1387, the researcher came to the conclusion that Dmitry’s army included detachments from Moscow, Kolomna, Zvenigorod, Mozhaisk, Volok, Serpukhov, Borovsk, Dmitrov, Pereyaslavl, Vladimir, Yuryev, Kostroma, Uglich, Galich, Bezhetsky Verkh, Vologda, Torzhok, as well as military contingents deployed by the principalities of Belozersky, Yaroslavl, Rostov, Starodubsky, Molozhsky, Kashinsky, Vyazemsky-Dorogobuzhsky, Tarussko-Obolensky and Novosilsky. To them it is also necessary to add the “courts” of the rogue princes Andrei and Dmitry Olgerdovich and Roman Mikhailovich Bryansky, and, possibly, a detachment of Novgorodians.
A. Gorsky also did not exclude the participation in the battle (in the regiment of Vladimir Andreevich) of detachments from the Yeletsk and Murom principalities, as well as from Meshchera. Analysis of information from the earliest sources gives slightly different, smaller values - 9 princely “courts” and 12 “land” “regiments” and, possibly, Ryazanians (Pronchans -?) and Novgorodians.
Taking into account these data and information about the number of “yards” and “land” “regiments” (very roughly counting the princely “courts” as 500 horsemen each, and the “land” “regiments” made up of small patrimonial landowners as 100), we can assume that the total number of warriors fielded by Dmitry Ivanovich was between 6 and 15 thousand people.
The spread is very large. The knowledge we have today regarding the nature of the battle site allows us to narrow this scope.
Both armies were most likely mounted. Real infantry, foot soldiers, were hardly present on the Kulikovo Field. The unprofessional “Zemstvo” militia, assembled from time to time and without appropriate training, was unable to withstand 30-kilometer marches for several days (unless they were mounted on carts for greater march speed - such a practice, judging by later times, existed. But in this case it will inevitably be small). It is possible that some of the Russian horsemen could dismount. This is unlikely, although this option cannot be completely ruled out. In any case, among the finds of weapons on the Kulikovo field, the tip of one spear was found, which was the weapon of Russian foot soldiers.
It can be stated with a high degree of confidence that even for 15-16 thousand troops, the Kulikovo field was too small - with a field size of 1.5 by 1 km, at best, approximately 5-6 thousand horsemen could operate more or less freely on it ( i.e. we see the figure named by S. Veselovsky as an assumption). We consider this figure to be the most consistent with both the conditions of the battle and the tactics of that time, and, therefore, the most probable. And if we assume those named in “Zadonshchina” and in the so-called. “Synodike of the Assumption Cathedral”, which was published by N.I. Novikov, lists of Russian losses (11 governors and approximately 400-500 “boyars”, i.e. small fiefdoms who appeared under the princely banners “on horse, in people and in arms”, at the head of a small, 3-5 person retinue) corresponding in general reality, then the loss in battle of at least 10% of experienced, professional warriors, whose training lasted for decades, should have been regarded as very difficult.
The famous battle in 1380 between the troops of Moscow Prince Dmitry and his allies, on the one hand, against the hordes of the Tatar-Mongol Khan Mamai and his allies, on the other, was called the Battle of Kulikovo.
A brief background to the Battle of Kulikovo is as follows: relations between Prince Dmitry Ivanovich and Mamai began to deteriorate back in 1371, when the latter gave the label for the great reign of Vladimir to Mikhail Alexandrovich Tverskoy, and the Moscow prince opposed this and did not allow the Horde protege into Vladimir. And a few years later, on August 11, 1378, Dmitry Ivanovich’s troops inflicted a crushing defeat on the Mongol-Tatar army led by Murza Begich in the Battle of the Vozha River. Then the prince refused to increase the tribute paid to the Golden Horde and Mamai gathered a new large army and moved it towards Moscow.
Before setting out on the campaign, Dmitry Ivanovich visited the holy Venerable Sergius of Radonezh, who blessed the prince and the entire Russian army for the battle with foreigners. Mamai hoped to unite with his allies: Oleg Ryazan and the Lithuanian prince Jagiello, but did not have time: the Moscow ruler, contrary to expectations, crossed the Oka on August 26, and later moved to the southern bank of the Don. The number of Russian troops before the Battle of Kulikovo is estimated from 40 to 70 thousand people, Mongol-Tatar - 100-150 thousand people. The Muscovites received great help from Pskov, Pereyaslavl-Zalessky, Novgorod, Bryansk, Smolensk and other Russian cities, whose rulers sent troops to Prince Dmitry.
The battle took place on the southern bank of the Don, on the Kulikovo Field on September 8, 1380. After several skirmishes, the advance detachments left in front of the troops from the Tatar army - Chelubey, and from the Russian - the monk Peresvet, and a duel took place in which they both died. After this the main battle began. Russian regiments went into battle under a red banner with a golden image of Jesus Christ.
Briefly speaking, the Battle of Kulikovo ended in victory for the Russian troops, largely thanks to military cunning: an ambush regiment under the command of Prince Vladimir Andreevich Serpukhovsky and Dmitry Mikhailovich Bobrok-Volynsky hid in an oak grove located next to the battlefield. Mamai concentrated his main efforts on the left flank, the Russians suffered losses, retreated, and it seemed that victory was close. But at this very time, an ambush regiment entered the Battle of Kulikovo and struck the unsuspecting Mongol-Tatars in the rear. This maneuver turned out to be decisive: the troops of the Khan of the Golden Horde were defeated and fled.
The losses of Russian forces in the Battle of Kulikovo amounted to about 20 thousand people, Mamai’s troops died almost completely. Prince Dmitry himself, later nicknamed Donskoy, exchanged horse and armor with the Moscow boyar Mikhail Andreevich Brenok and took an active part in the battle. The boyar died in the battle, and the prince, knocked off his horse, was found unconscious under a felled birch tree.
This battle was of great importance for the further course of Russian history. Briefly speaking, the Battle of Kulikovo, although it did not liberate Rus' from the Mongol-Tatar yoke, but created the preconditions for this to happen in the future. In addition, the victory over Mamai significantly strengthened the Moscow Principality.
